




I. INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHIES
This Note examines the opinions and legal commentary on the Kirvas
Joel' case decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1994. The case
turned on the constitutionality, under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, of New York State legislation establishing a separate school
district providing special education exclusively for Hasidic Jewish children.
The Court deemed that legislation an unconstitutional establishment of
religion.2 However, in line with certain dicta of the Court, the legislation was
redrafted in a fashion which, until August 1996, appeared to permit the
separate school district to continue. At present the fate of the district is once
again being litigated .
A substantial amount of commentary has already been written about Kiryas
Joel. Student notes on the case are frequently concerned with the implications
of Kiryas Joel for Supreme Court standards in deciding religious establishment
cases-an area of law that has been notoriously troublesome to the Court in
recent decades.4 Professors and other legal scholars have analyzed the case as
1. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v Grumet. 114 S Ct 2481 t1994)
2. See id. at 2483.
3. See Grumet v. Cuomo, 647 N.Y.S.2d 565 (App. Div 1996)
4. See, e.g., Scott S. Thomas, Note, Be.ond a Sour Lemon: A Look at Grumct Board of Education
of the Kiryas Joel Village School District. 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 531 (1994) (claiming that Ktrna.5 Joel
"'perpetuated the current problems involved in Establishment Clause junsprudencc"). Susan E Acklin,
Casenote, 41 LoY. L. REv. 43 (1995) (viewing Kir.as Joel as another in seites of cases moing as a) from
"Lemon test" for establishment of religion, first articulated in Lenton t. Kurrotan. 403 U S_ 602 t 1971 )
To survive scrutiny under the Lemon test, a legislative enactment must I) reflect a secular purpoc. 2) hase
a primary effect that does not advance or inhtit reltgton: and 3) a'otd cxccssste govermental
entanglement with religion. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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an exampe of the current Court's secularist bias5 and as an example of the
need to examine constitutional issues from the perspective of minority
groups.6 The most exhaustive exchange on Kiryas Joel began with a 1996
article by Professor Abner Greene, who argued strongly for the right to
semi-autonomy of groups that demonstrate their commitment to their own
principles by separating themselves geographically.' Greene's article sparked
responses from Christopher Eisgruber, who claimed that assimilation is a
constitutional value,8 and Ira Lupu, who was concerned that the current
arrangement masks abuses of democratic process within Kiryas Joel.9
This Note argues that the judicial opinions and the legal commentary on
Kiryas Joel share a common underlying conception of the relationship between
identity (the nature of the subject of rights) and polity (the constituency of the
state). In that underlying conception, the polity is understood as consisting of
all the citizens of a neutrally bounded territory (a municipality or state), while
the subject of rights is taken to be the individual person.0 This Note explores
the ways in which the assumptions of neutral territory and the individual
subject have shaped the literature on Kiryas Joel. It articulates an alternative
underlying conception of political identity as organized around diaspora
(primary orientation somewhere other than a group's present residence) and
genealogy (family and group descent and upbringing). It claims that this
alternative underlying conception animates the residents of Kiryas Joel in their
search for the culturally acceptable provision of special education.
This Note claims that jurisprudence on this case should attend to
genealogy and diaspora as the cultural contexts of the Kiryas Joel dispute.
Moreover, it claims that the search for principles of religious "neutrality" in
constitutional jurisprudence is inseparable from Protestant traditions of
individual liberty of belief and thus may be ill-suited to determining the
religious rights of many Americans today. The argument is neither in favor of
one of these conceptions of identity nor against the other; it seeks to
demonstrate the contingency (rather than universality) of individualism and
territoriality on the one hand and the coherence of genealogy and diaspora on
the other.
Part II of this Note discusses the origins of the dispute and the history of
the legislation. Part III explains the contrasting conceptions of polity and
identity informing discussions of Kiryas Joel. Part III also discusses Robert
5. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel School
District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Constitution and the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. L.J. 1 (1995).
7. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43-51
(1996).
8. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 87
(1996).
9. See Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 104 (1996).
10. See infra Part I1.
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Cover's Nomnos and Narrative," an essay in jurisprudence that has influenced
much of the existing literature on Kir'as Joel. Part IV looks closely at the
rhetoric used in that existing literature to demonstrate how individualist and
territorial assumptions subtly influence accounts of the case. Part V reviews the
divergent processes that led to the creation of the Village of Kiryas Joel and
to the creation of the Kiryas Joel School District from the alternative
perspective of genealogy and diaspora. Part VI focuses on the dilemma of the
community and the children, and suggests that the tension between the
territorialist-individualist and the genealogical-diasporic frameworks of identity
is perhaps most powerfully revealed in disputes involving jurisdiction over
children. The Conclusion argues that satisfactory adjudication of the case may
not be possible as long as the individualist and territorialist conceptions
implicit within the Court's analysis remain unexamined.
II. THE PLACE AND THE CASE
This Part of the Note briefly outlines the origins of the Kiryas Joel
community and the conflict leading to the Kir'as Joel litigation.' 2 The
residents of the Village of Kiryas Joel in New York State are known as Satmar
Hasidim. Their lifestyle and social organization are devoted to the observance
of the Torah, Rabbinic teachings, and their ancestral communal traditions.
They identify with other groups of Satmar Hasidim in the United States,
Europe, and Israel, with related (and generally smaller) Hasidic communities,
with all Orthodox Jews, and to a lesser extent perhaps, with all persons whom
they regard as Jewish. 3 Their relations with the non-Jewish populations
among which they live are, by contrast, often distant.
After World War II, Joel Teitelbaum, known as the Satmarer Rot or
Rebbe, 5 settled in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York. He was
a dynamic and charismatic leader who managed to reconstitute a community
of Satmar Hasidim. In the decades following World War II, Williamsburg
became a thriving center of Hasidic life, containing numerous Hasidic groups
11. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court. 1982 Tern-Foren ord Voinos and Narrati, e. 97 H ARv
L. REv. 4 (1983).
12. Any attempt at "'cultural translation," including this one. is shaped bN the situation of the snter
and his intended audience. Hence, while I attempt to be accurate here. this account should not be presumed
objective. See generally Talal Asad, The Concept ofTranslation in Britsh Social Anthropologi. in WRMG
CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY 141 (James Clifford & George E Marcus cds.
1986).
13. See MAUD B. WEISS Er AL., THE CHALLENGE OF PIETY- SATIAR HASIDIM I% NE. YORK 26
(1995).
14. See JEROME R. MINT, HASIDIC PEOPLE: A PLACE IN THE NEWVORLD 249 (1992) (stating that
in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, Kiryas Joel's "parent" community. Hasidic and Latino "societies appear as far
apart as winter and summer").
15. In Yiddish, Roy in this context refers to the rabbi of a town. Rebbe to the leader of a group of
Hasidim. Rabbi Teitelbaum had been the rabbi of the town of Satu Maru in Hungary, but as the leader of
Hasidim, he was also thought of and referred to as Rebbe.
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living in close proximity to each other.16 As communities were reassembled
and the survivors' families multiplied, that area of Williamsburg readily
available to Hasidic residents became extremely crowded. This fostered the
establishment of various "satellite" communities in upstate New York .
7
One such satellite was established by Satmar Hasidim in an area of
Monroe, New York. Several years later, a zoning dispute arose, leading to the
establishment in 1977 of the separate Village of Kiryas Joel.' 8 The new
Village was composed exclusively of Satmar Hasidim, substantially because
neighbors did not want to secede with the Satmars.' 9
Because of the universal preference for private religious schooling among
the Satmar Hasidim in Kiryas Joel, particular arrangements have been made
for the provision of publicly funded special education services to handicapped
Satmar children there. For one year beginning in 1984, such services were
provided by the Monroe-Woodbury School District at an annex to the Bais
Rochel girls' school,20 but this arrangement was ended2' after the Supreme
Court decisions in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball22 and Aguilar v.
Felton.23 Instead, the Monroe-Woodbury district offered special education for
the Satmar children in regular public schools, which their families found highly
unsatisfactory.2 4 Ultimately, the New York legislature passed the statute at
issue in Kiryas Joel, specifically naming the Village of Kiryas Joel as an
independent school district with plenary powers.25 Thus, unlike the Village,
which was established by residents acting in accordance with existing state
law, the school district was created by a special act of the legislature. Special
education services have been provided to Hasidic children from Kiryas Joel as
well as neighboring districts.2 6 The head of the school is not Jewish, and the
school's curriculum is thoroughly secular. Not all of the residents of the
16. See WEISS ET AL., supra note 13, at 13-17.
17. See DAVID LANDAU, PIETY AND POWER: THE WORLD OF JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM 277-78
(1993).
18. The Village was incorporated pursuant to a statute providing for the incorporation as a village of
a territory meeting certain population and area requirements, subsequent to a petition for incorporation and
an election to determine the question of incorporation. See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 2-200, 2-202, 2-212
(McKinney Supp. 1996).
19. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1994).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that supplementary classes provided at public expense to religious
school students at religious schools violated Establishment Clause).
23. 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that New York City's use of federal funds to pay public school
employees to teach educationally deprived children in parochial schools violated Establishment Clause
because of inevitable excessive entanglement of church and state).
24. See Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485. The stated reason for their dissatisfaction is discussed below.
See infra text accompanying notes 153-54. Actual reasons are suggested below. See infra text
accompanying notes 156-58.
25. See Kityas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486 (citing 1989 N.Y. Laws 748, titled "An Act to establish a
separate school district in and for the Village of Kiryas Joel, Orange County").
26. See id.
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Village support this arrangement for the education of Kiryas Joel's
handicapped children. -7
Justice Souter announced the judgment of the Court. "- Finding anomalous
the creation of the smaller school district when the general trend was toward
consolidation, 29 and concerned that the residents of Kiryas Joel had benefited
from a special act of the legislature, the Court held the legislation creating the
District to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion." Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, however, suggested that government action
accomplishing the same end but "implemented through generally applicable
legislation ' 31 would be acceptable. Promptly following the announcement, the
New York legislature redrafted the legislation in terms that did not refer
specifically to Kiryas Joel and purported to lay out neutral criteria under which
a community could apply for separate school district status.3- The new
legislation was soon challenged, however. In August 1996, the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court held the new legislation
unconstitutional, finding that "in enacting the current law, the Legislature
simply resurrected the prior law by achieving exactly the same result through
27. See infra text accompanying note 77.
28. The bulk of his opinion was joined by four other Justices. and another part b) onl three There
were four separate concurring opinions. See Kir3vas Joel. 114 S Ct at 2494 (Blackmun. J . concurrng)
(disagreeing "with any suggestion that today's decision signals a departure from the principles described
in Lemon v. Kurtzman [403 U.S. 602 (1971)]"); id. at 2495 (Stesens. J . concumng) targuing that State
could have alleviated children's fear "by teaching their schoolmates to be tolerant and respectful of Satmar
customs"); id. at 2498 (O'Connor. J., concurring) (expressing concern about "'the nature of the legislatise
process" leading to establishment of school district); id. at 2500-01 tKenned,. J . concurrngt te.prcmig
concern that opinion goes too far in limiting constitutionally permissible accommodation of religioni
Justice Scalia filed a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas See id at 2506 t Scalia.
J., dissenting) (declaring himself "not surprised" at Court's use of Establishment Clause "to prohibit
characteristically and admirably American accommodation of the religious practices tor more precisl).
cultural peculiarities) of a tiny minority sect").
29. See id. at 2490.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 2498 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
32. The statute reads in part:
3. Any municipality situated wholly within a single central or union free school district.
but whose boundaries are not coterminous with the boundaries of such school district. may
organize a new union free school district, pursuant to the provisions of this subdisision.
consisting of the entire territory of such municipality. wheneser the education interests of the
community require it.
a. No such new school district may be organized unless () the enrollment of the
municipality seeking to organize such new school district equals at least tuo thousand children.
and is no greater than sixty percent of the enrollment of the existing school district from .,hich
such new school district will be organized; (ii) such new school district ,,ould hase an actual
valuation per total wealth pupil unit at least equal to the stateside average; (tit) the enrollment
of the existing school district from which such nes, school district will be organized equals at
least two thousand children, excluding the residents of such municipality: (i%) the actual
valuation per total wealth pupil unit of such existing school district ,, ill not increase or decrease
by more than ten percent following the organization of the new school district b) such
municipality.
N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 1504(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 1537
carefully crafted indirect means. 33 That court's reference to the earlier
Supreme Court decision as "Kiryas Joel I" perhaps anticipates that the
litigation is likely to rise through the courts once again.
III. FRAMES OF JURIDICAL IDENTITY
This Part details the alternative concepts underlying different
understandings of the relation between polity and identity. First I discuss the
notions of individualism and territory. I then revisit Cover's essay Nomos and
Narrative as a critique of the neutralist jurisprudence associated with
individualism and territory. The last Section of this Part articulates the notions
of diaspora and genealogy, which are absent from Cover's own account of
jurisprudence, but complementary with and critical to his project.
A. Individualism and Territory
The notion of identity implicit in U.S. constitutionalist discourse relies on
two interlinked principles. The first of these is the normativity of Protestant
individualism in all its denominational variety.35 The notion of religious
freedoms-from the coercion of state religion or to exercise
religion-contemplated by the drafters of the First Amendment doubtless
reflected the Protestant emphasis on individual faith as the bedrock of religious
integrity. Faith and individualism both facilitated the separation of a public
sphere substantially shaped by state law from a more autonomous private
sphere.36
33. Grumet v. Cuomo, 647 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (App. Div. 1996). The Appellate Division found that
the demographic criteria in the new law, see supra note 32, were in fact designed to apply only to the
Kiryas Joel situation and "fulfillaed] no existing educational purpose." Grunet, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 569. The
new law thus served only to maintain the status quo which the Supreme Court had declared
unconstitutional. The Appellate Division stated that Justice O'Connor's formula would only have been met
"[h]ad the current law permitted any existing municipality, or even any village, to form a school district
if it obtained appropriate approvals and also fulfilled statutory criteria designed to evidence a special
educational need for a separate school district." Id. at 570.
34. Id. at 567.
35. See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional
Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 373 (1996) (presenting citations from end of eighteenth century
identifying range of toleration with varieties of Christian beliefs). The frequent emphasis on religious
voluntarism in constitutional jurisprudence is identified by Witte primarily with the evangelical view and
Enlightenment thought, two of the four major strands (along with Puritanism and civic republicanism) that
contributed toward policies on religious freedom in the early United States. See id. at 377, 382-83. As
Witte writes: "These lofty protections of individual religious rights went hand-in-hand with the close
restrictions on corporate religious rights that were also advocated by enlightenment exponents." Id. at 385.
36. See Berg, supra note 5, at 442 ("[W]ith a general Protestant ethos underlying society, government
could remain separate from any particular church without unnaturally constricting the contribution made
to public life by the citizenry's general religious values."). Subsequently, however, "[t]he vigorous pursuit
of these aspects of separation in the context of an active state created the fundamental problem of Religion
Clause interpretation: it put nonestablishment at war with free exercise." Id. at 443.
Few Protestant groups have relied solely on recruitment of individual adults to sustain themselves,
and thus the association of Protestantism with pure individualism can easily be overstated. In terms of
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The second of the two interlinked principles is "the long-standing
Anglo-American commitment to organizing political representation around
geography. ' 37 Governments and their constituencies are thus bounded by
geographic lines. This commitment is so deeply ingrained in our normative
political culture that it is often difficult to see how representation could be
conceived otherwise. 38  As the political philosopher William Connolly
explains: "The democratic, territorial state sets itself up to be the sovereign
protector of its people, the highest site of their allegiance, and the
organizational basis of their nationhood. ' 39 However, "few states, if any,
actually maintain close alignment between this image of the sovereign,
territorial, national, democratic security state and their actual practices."'
Connolly's point may be extended: In fact, all states are riven by failures to
guarantee personal security and democratic freedoms, by hierarchizing myths
that systematically exclude certain categories of persons from full participation
within the presumed national collective, and by the existence of profound
constitutional jurisprudence, however, the exception goes some distance tou,.ard pro% ing the rule here Thus
the Supreme Court ruled in Wisconsin r. Yoder, 406 U.S 205 (1972). that Amish families could not be
forced to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade. Yet in his dissent. Justice Douglas insisted
that
[w]here the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires. it sould be an
invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition sithout can% assing is % les s
And, if an Amish child desires to attend high school, and is mature enough to ha% ¢ that desire
respected, the State may well be able to override the parents' religiousl) motl'ated objections
Id. at 242 (Douglas. J., dissenting in part). I see Justice Douglas's )ader dissent as one of the sources of
Justice Stevens's concurrence in Kiryas Joel. See utfra text accompan) ing notes 164-65
37. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressit e larnis. 'Bizarre Dsstricts. " and Votiil' Rihts
Evaluating Election -District Appearances After Shaw v Reno. 92 MIcil L. REv 483. 483 t 1993)
38. Tribal "governments" are, of course, not based on pnnciples of indi% idualism and neutral terntor)
See, e.g., PIERRE CLASTRES, SoCiETY AGAINST TME STATE (1987) Such face-to-face groups do not
confront complex questions of representation. One altematise model. ,,hich cannot be explored in detail
here, is the Ottoman Empire's strategy of representation by ethnic communities ,% iihin the temtor) of the
empire. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Constitutions and Culture Studies. 2 YALE J L & liI .t'x, 133.
138 (1990) ("What characterizes the [Ottoman Empire] is the extraordinarily actise and sastly
heterogeneous diasporic activity that is constantly afoot on its terrain."). Another model is that of the
"Gypsies." See Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous L awmnaking The Case of the
"Gypsies", 103 YALE L.J. 323, 325 (1993) (using "the law of the G) psis as an example of an autonomous
legal system, one which operates outside the parameters of state lay.") For an extended reconsideration of
the principle of "one nation per state" in the context of Kir"as Joel and Shaw v. Reno. 509 U S 630 11993).
see James U. Blacksher, Majorit'y Black Districts, Kiryas Joel. and Other Challenges to American
Nationalism, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 407, 444-49 (1996).
39. WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE ETHOS OF PLURAuZATION 135 (1995) According to Connoll). tso
of the key elements of the democratic, territorial state are:
(2) the recognition of a people (or nation) on la contiguous) terrtory, bound together b)
a set of shared understandings, identities, debates, and traditions that. it is said. makes possible
a common moral life and provides the basis upon vhich citizen/alien and member/stranger are
differentiated; [and]
(3) the organization of institutions of electoral accountability and constitutional restraint
that enable the territonalized people with shared understandings to rule iherusclcs shile
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competing loyalties among their constituents.41 Given especially this last gap
between state ideal and state practice, it is no surprise. that constitutional
debates frequently turn on the degree of accommodation the state will make
to the "actual practices" of its citizens.
42
Litigation strategies may reflect implicit awareness of individualist and/or
territorial conceptions of identity. Thus one of the signal ironies of Kiryas Joel
is the reflection of individualist bias in the court papers on behalf of the school
district. "The Satmare 3 did not claim that separation from non-Satmar was
religiously required, explaining that they live together and avoid integration
with the larger community 'to facilitate individual religious observance and
maintain social, cultural and religious values." '44 This stance on the part of
the legal representatives of the Kiryas Joel residents is cast in terms of a
value-neutral, territorial choice. It seems designed, on the one hand, to avoid
any overtones of the kind of segregation discouraged in racial discrimination
cases and, on the other hand, to emphasize the individual subject of the right
to religious freedoms.45 It is true that when the Village of Kiryas Joel was
originally set up, the village boundary lines were drawn "so as to exclude all
but Satmars."'' 6 However, this was done at least in part because "[n]eighbors
who did not wish to secede with the Satmars objected strenuously."
47
B. Robert Cover's Intervention
The extent to which the dossier on Kiryas Joel assumes that the particular
values and collective understandings-the "nomos"-of the residents of Kiryas
Joel are relevant to the case points to the influence of Cover's classic essay,
48
41. See, e.g., BRUCE KAPFERER, LEGENDS OF PEOPLE, MYTHS OF STATE: VIOLENCE, INTOLERANCE,
AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN SRI LANKA AND AUSTRALIA (1988); REMAPPING MEMORY: THE POLITICS OF
TIMESPACE (Jonathan Boyarin ed., 1993).
42. See Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992); Michael
W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 685 (1992).
43. The papers and commentaries refer to the residents variously as "the Satmar," "the Satmar
Hasidim" (most commonly), and "the Satmarer Hasidim" (which is closest to the Yiddish designation for
the group).
44. Alison Wheeler, Recent Development, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 223, 242 (1995) (citing Board
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2492 n.9 (1994) (quoting Brief for
Petitioner at 4 n.I)) (emphasis added).
45. One possible alternative would be to claim such separation as a group or community right. See,
e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and
Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 149 (1990) ("Religions
represent communities as well as individual identities."). Such a claim would have entailed even greater
exposure to a charge of violation of the Establishment Clause. Furthermore, it is impossible to make
categorical distinctions *between "communities" and "individuals" as subjects of religious or other
representation. Because the boundaries of the individual and of the group are at stake within and beyond
Kiryas Joel, Brownstein's remark brings us no closer to an understanding of the links among religion,
identity, and polity.
46. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2489.
47. Id. at 2485.
48. Cover, supra note II.
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published a decade before the Kiryas Joel litigation was moving through the
courts. Nomos and Narrative is relevant to Kiryas Joel because Kiryas Joel
throws into question the individualist and territorial assumptions underlying the
ideal of an objective, rule-based, and universally valid body of law, an ideal
which Cover's critique eloquently undermines. Nonos and Narrative
challenges a purely formalist or proceduralist conception of liberal state
jurisprudence. Cover in effect denies that any judgment can be made on the
basis of purely objective, universally valid legal principles. Rather, Cover
asserts that the state should take seriously self-governing communities' claims
to interpret the Constitution as it applies to them.
The essay begins with the announcement that "[w]e inhabit a nomos-a
normative universe."49 This "normative universe is held together by the force
of interpretive commitments-some small and private, others immense and
public." 50 Those interpretive commitments are contained in "narratives in
which the corpus juris is located"5' and thus determine the meaning of
law.52 Nomos and Narrative thus presents a theory of tensions within
constitutional jurisprudence that makes strong claims for the jurisprudential
authority of largely self-governing communities such as the Hasidic community
of Kiryas Joel.53 While Cover's analysis centers on the dynamics of such
autonomous or semi-autonomous communities, he insists that "the nomos of
officialdom is also 'particular."' ' On the other hand, regarding the state as
the only origin of law "confuses the status of interpretation with the status of
political domination."'55
Furthermore, Nomos and Narrative centers on a case, Bob Jones University
v. United States,56 which has been cited by at least one authority as
presenting issues analogous to those in Kir'as Joel." Bob Jones was not the
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 9.
52. See id.
53. In a key passage, Cover takes the contemporary Mennonites as excmplar , of such nonstate nomic
orders:
I am asserting that within the domain of constitutional meaning, the understanding of the
Mennonites assumes a status equal (or superior) to that accorded to the understanding of the
Justices of the Supreme Court. In this realm of meaning-if not in the domain of social
control---the Mennonite community creates law as fully as does the judge First. the Mennonites
inhabit an ongoing nomos that must be marked off by a normative boundary from the realm of
civil coercion, just as the wielders of state power must establish their boundary %% ith a religious
community's resistance and autonomy. Each group must accommodate in its osn normati'c
world the objective reality of the other. There may or may not be synchronization or
convergence in their respective understandings about the normatise boundary and uhat it
implies. But from a position that starts as neutral--that is, nonstatist-in its understandtng of
law, the interpretations offered by judges are not necessarily superior
Id. at 28-29.
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. at 43.
56. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
57. See Lupu, supra note 9, at 109-10. For more discussion of the association of the tuo cases in
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easiest test of Cover's thesis that the claims of self-governing communities
should be taken seriously vis-h-vis the "imperial" state. In that case, Bob Jones
University claimed the right to maintain tax-free status as well as the right to
practice racial exclusion in its admissions process. Cover, who had participated
in the twentieth-century fight for civil rights, would hardly have shared the
University's value of white separationism. In this light, the nomos in Bob
Jones University appears unattractive in comparison to the imperial lawmaking
authority of the democratic state. That the argument for taking nomoi
seriously,58 so to speak, could be made by taking such an unattractive nomos
as exemplary adds continuing resonance to Cover's argument. Nevertheless,
many commentators recognize Kiryas Joel as a more poetically appropriate test
of Cover's argument in Nomos and Narrative.59
This Note argues, however, that Kiryas Joel points toward flawed or
incomplete points in Nomos and Narrative. First, one of Cover's major foci is
the concept of "jurisgenesis," by which he means the creative aspect of
jurisprudence, the "principle by which legal meaning proliferates in all
communities.', 60 That creative process is largely contained in narratives that
the juridical community tells to itself. For Cover, jurisgenesis seems to be the
province of authoritative adult males creating law through discourse. Thus, the
concept of jurisgenesis, as of nomos, is as applicable to the "community" of
Supreme Court Justices as it is to the Mennonites or the Satmar Hasidim.
Furthermore, Cover's jurisgenesis seems to take place at one remove from the
full reproductive processes of kin-based communities. Nowhere in Nomos and
Narrative does Cover relate meaning-creating narratives to generation in its
more immediate sense-to the biocultural reproduction of groups owing
allegiance to their own nomoi. That form of generation or genealogy, as I
argue below, is crucial to understanding the situation of the people of the
Village of Kiryas Joel.6' Without it, the question of including handicapped
children in the community might seem less urgent. They are, after all, arguably
less likely than other children to be the community's future jurists.
Furthermore, Cover's exclusive focus on covenantal communities reinforces a
Lupu's argument, see infra text accompanying note 112.
58. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RtGHTS SERIOUSLY (1980).
59. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 7, at 43 ("Kiryas Joel presents perhaps the most appealing
constitutional case for a special school district (or other grant of local political power) for a distinct group:
The group is a minority, it is religious (and thereby nomic), and it has exited a heterogeneous setting
precisely to establish a separate nomos."). Christopher Eisgruber uses the term "ethical diversity" rather
than "nomos," but apologizes (perhaps tongue in cheek) for the substitution. See Eisgrubcr, supra note 8,
at 88 n.7.
60. Cover, supra note II, at 40.
61. Suzanne Stone argues that Cover's alternative model of the Jewish relation to identity in and
through law is of only limited potential application to a liberal jurisprudence such as that of the United
States: "According to Jewish legal tradition, many Jewish legal principles are neither appropriate nor
necessary for conventional polities because these principles are tied to particularist religious ideals."
Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary
American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REv. 813, 821 n.39 (1993).
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tendency to misunderstand the Kiryas Joel community by analogy to groups
of Protestant dissidents, with their emphasis on conscience and faith, and tends
to obscure the importance of family loyalty and persistent ways of life that are
as crucial as explicit "law" in maintaining the Satmar community. 62
Second, Cover's eloquent account of the interpretive and
meaning-producing claims of small-scale communities facing the liberal state
casts these as claims about interpretation of the United States Constitution.
Thus, discussing the rights of Mennonite religious communities, he asserts, "I
am making a very strong claim for the Mennonite understanding of the first
amendment. ' 63 He does not address the possibility that communal
self-understandings (such as those I call diasporic, as explained below) may
ignore, rather than contest or seek to conform to, the broader jurisprudential
nomos of the state. This helps enable a claim that only those communal
understandings that overtly contest and hence invigorate the majority consensus
are worthy of any constitutional deference.'
Cover's broad arguments about the relation between meaning-generating
communities and the conflicts of individual and group rights can and should
be given added focus and vigor through the concepts of genealogy and
diaspora, to which I now turn.
C. Genealogy and Diaspora
Against the schema of individualism and territory may be counterposed
another way of linking polity and identity. This alternative logic relies on the
principles of genealogy and diaspora. Genealogy contrasts rather sharply with
individualism. Rather than being suspicious of claims to group allegiance based
on facts of birth, genealogy favors the assumption that much of what people
are and should do is determined by the families into which they are born."5
Rather than assuming that associations are made primarily by autonomous
persons who determine that they have shared interests, it ultimately views
communities along the model of extended kinship groups. Rather than
assuming that facilitation of each person's self-fulfillment is the proper goal
of social organization, it aims toward the maximization of collective integrity,
62. See infra Section IV.A.
63. Cover, supra note 1I, at 28.
64. See infra text accompanying note 109.
65. The Hasidic obsession with children and family is a rare example of an accurate stcreot)pe See
MtNTZ, supra note 14, at 68 ("The major focus of the Hasidic family is to produce. nurture, and educate
the children. This is a virtue sustained by law and custom and reinforced by a commonl) understood need
to replace the generation that vanished [in the Holocaust].*). Here the functional link between genealogy
and diaspora is clear. An emphasis on the primary value of loyalty to earlier generattons and thetr
replacement as continuity through child-rearing reinforces the imperative of communal identity Genealogy
thus provides the historical continuity that a diasponc group cannot obtain from the secunty of teritoral
exclusivity and dominance.
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security, and perpetuation. 66 Rather than positing a bright line separating
nurture from nature, or culture from biology, it assumes continuity among
birth, upbringing, and identity.
Diaspora broadly describes the phenomenon by which groups of people
identify with each other on the basis of certain shared characteristics and a
shared place of origin from which (in the recent or legendary past) they or
their ancestors have been removed.67 There may be profound dislocations not
only between peoples in diaspora and their ancestral homeland, but also
between communities of the same diaspora in different parts of the world.
Diasporas resist any scheme in which primary allegiances are supposed to be
determined by local contiguity with the surrounding population, regardless of
differing ancestry and background. Lacking the means of coercion available
even to democratic territorial states, diasporic communities stress and
"enforce," to the extent they can, the genealogical constraints on their
members' identities.68
Having identified the notions of diaspora (in which territory is not a
neutral ground for citizenship) and genealogy (in which identity is substantially
determined by ancestry), it becomes possible to see how mainstream American
notions of polity and identity depend on a subordination of ancestry and
"foreign" geographical origin. Thus the individualist bent of American politics
is tied to a historically grounded rejection of genealogy. The forms of
genealogy involved in this Americanist rejection were primarily those
determining hereditary social stigmas and privileges. In English political theory
at least, by the turn of the eighteenth century, "'genetic justification and the
identification of familial and political power were becoming dead issues."'' 69
The rejection of inherited stigmas is explicit in the U.S. Constitution's
provision that no citizen shall suffer from "corruption of blood,"7 that is, that
no one will be deprived of privileges enjoyed by any other citizen because of
his or her parent's treason. Likewise, there are to be no titles of nobility
conferred or recognized by the United States.7' Metaphorically, the newly
66. See generally Daniel Boyarin & Jonathan Boyarin, Diaspora: Generation and the Ground of
Jewish Identity, 19 CRITICAL INQUIRY 693 (1993) (discussing relevance of Jewish diasporic experience for
transnational identities in contemporary world). Because of the centrality of reproduction in genealogy, it
cannot be conflated with the notion of "the group" as a cross section of mutually affiliated individuals at
any given time. See JONATHAN BOYARIN, Self.Exposure as Theory: The Double Mark of the Male Jew, in
THINKING IN JEVISH 34 (1996).
67. See generally James Clifford, Diasporas, 9 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 302 (1994) (discussing
difficulty of formulating definition of"diaspora" which accurately captures experiences of different groups).
68. See Jonathan Boyarin, Powers of Diaspora (Nov. 1, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Yale Law Journal); see also SOLOMON POLL, THE HASIDIC COMMUNITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 81 (1962)
("Upward social mobility [in the Hasidic community] is in direct relationship to strict religious conformity.
The Hasidic basis for upward mobility is remarkably similar to that of the American soldier, who has a
better chance for promotion if he conforms to established military norms.").
69. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 24 (1988) (quoting GORDON SCHOCHI T,
PATRIARCHALISM IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 276 (1975)).
70. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
71. See id. art. II, § 9, cl. 8; id. § 10, cl. I.
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united states could be seen as acting to dissolve ties to England as the "mother
country.
72
However, the rejection of genealogy is inconsistent with constitutionalist
arguments about the fundamental "commitments" of "the American people,"
such as those made by Eisgruber." There is no peoplehood without at least
some recourse to rhetorical genealogy, as our common reference to the
"Founding Fathers" makes clear.74 The claim that something called "the
American people" has made fundamental commitments to the Constitution
introduces through the back door a genealogical fiction that we are all
descendants of the Founders. The claim that American citizens today are bound
by compacts made in the late eighteenth century betrays the antigenealogical
premises animating the conception of personal freedom that informs the
Constitution. Perhaps Kiryas Joel ultimately is constitutionally "anomalous"
because it undermines the foundational notion of a genealogically open,
territorially defined peoplehood.
Considering Kiryas Joel in terms of diaspora and genealogy also helps to
clarify the conflict within Kiryas Joel and the larger Satmar community. That
conflict, which surrounded the succession to rabbinic leadership of the Satmar
after the death of Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum, extends beyond the school board
issue, and includes questions of accommodation or resistance to Zionism,"5
the movement of Jewish territorial nationalism.
This conflict also encompasses an agonizing debate over the degree of
"accommodation" to the surrounding State that should govern the Satmar
community's policy. Kenneth Karst has argued that "[a] cultural group's active
participation in politics is a step along the path to assimilation. 76 Implicitly,
this is the theory adopted by-and the fear motivating-the integrist minority
in Kiryas Joel that did not want any state involvement in the education of any
72. See Spivak, supra note 38, at 144 ("'Under the circumstances it was ncccssar) to efface another
signature of state by "dissolving" the lines of colonial paternity or maermit) ") (quoting JACQLES
DERRIDA, OTOBIOGRAPHIES: L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE NIETZSCHE ET LA POLIQLE DL NoMi PROPRE 24
(1984)). The Protestant notions of freedom and subjectivity at play in the foundation of the republic and
the writing of the Constitution were also informed by the Gospel's explicit ideal of subordinating. if not
totally rejecting, genealogy. The new "children of God" are those who "were born. not of blood, nor of the
will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." John 1:13. Hebrews 7:3 states that God's priest is
not only "fatherless" and "motherless," but even "without genealogy" (agenealogeos) See Anton Schutz.
Sons of Writ, Sons of Wrati: Pierre Legendre's Critique of Rational Law.Gitmg. 16 CARDOZO L REv
979, 1005 (1995); see also DANIEL BOYARIN, A RADICAL JEW: PALL ANsD TIE PoLMcs OF IDl,rr
(1994) (exploring implications of Paul's antigenealogical universalism for politics of identity in West)
73. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wlager: Religious Laberts in the Constitutional Order.
89 Nw. U. L. REv. 408-10 (describing how structurally embedded commitments of American people
entrench secularism).
74. The height of this inconsistency is reached in Justice Scalia's superficiall), eloquent but ultimately
absurd dictum: "In the eyes of government, we are just one race here, It is American" Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Scalia. J . concurnng in part and concurnng in
judgment).
75. See WE5ss ET AL., supra note 13, at 25.
76. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identur. 64 N C L REV
303, 331 (1986).
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of Kiryas Joel's children. That minority sees state-provided education as a
disservice to the handicapped and the beginning of a slippery slope toward
assimilation.77 Ironically, the constitutionality of the school board is attacked
in turn because of evidence of repression of that anti-assimilationist dissent
within the Village. 78 This repression of dissent is seen as evidence that
creating the school board constituted "granting political authority to a religious
group.,
79
I suggest that the foundations of both the Village and the school district
appear problematic not because they constituted the granting of political
authority "to a religious group" (which facially, of course, neither did), but
because the close identification among the constituents of both entities
precluded the fiction of an otherwise neutral and purely territorial
circumscription of polity. Contrary to what we would expect from this quote,
communal repression was not and is not exercised by the majority in Kiryas
Joel against those who would threaten the boundaries separating the residents
from the outside society. Instead, repression is aimed at those attempting to
perpetuate an older notion of greater separation, who also remain personally
loyal to the memory of the old leader, Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum. This faction in
the community associates the strategies of managerial accommodation,
negotiation, and resource maximization evident in the process leading to the
establishment of the Kiryas Joel Village School District with the new
leadership.80 Thus not only the constitutional theorist Karst, 81 but to this
extent perhaps the dissident faction as well, ignore the possibility that active
participation in politics might be the most effective way for a group to
negotiate the social space for its continued collective existence. Such is the
strategy pursued by the Satmar majority under the new Rebbe.
Viewing Kiryas Joel schematically as a conflict between principles of
territorial citizenship and individualism on one hand, and principles of
diasporic and genealogical allegiance on the other, thus helps to account for
77. During the earlier Kiryas Joel litigation, members of the minority demonstrated against the secular,
special education public school in Kiryas Joel. See Photograph, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 1993, at B4 (showing
posters bearing texts such as "Handicapped children are loved by God. Do not deny Him to them!!"). The
caption to the photograph mistakenly claims: "The protestors are asking that the school be allowed to
remain open." Id.
78. Dissidence was not limited to the issue of special education, and it was actively repressed. When
in 1988 some parents attempted to start an independent religious school, "[telephone threats were made
to the dissidents; automobile tires were slashed; and on occasion rocks were hurled through the window
of a shul or household." MiNTZ, supra note 14, at 315. Furthermore, dissidents who have run for election
to the school board have faced ostracism, vandalism, and death threats. See Jeffrey Rosen, Kiryas Joel and
Shaw v. Reno: A Text-Based Interpretivist Approach, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 387, 392 (1996).
79. Charles B. Schweitzer, Recent Decision, 33 DuQ. L. REV. 1007, 1030 n.181 (alluding to "fusion
test" of giving power to religious institution traced by Justice Souter to opinion in Larkin v. Grendel's Den.
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982)).
80. As one anonymous informant reported: "'The [new] Rebbe is losing the respect of the people.
[Under him] [t]he community works like a well-established business."' MINTZ, supra note 14, at 211. The
extent of this "loss of respect," however, should not be exaggerated.
81. See supra note 76.
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disturbing aspects of the Kiryas Joel community without necessitating a
conclusion that its governmental powers are illegitimate. Furthermore, this
schematic account makes it possible to see more clearly the contingent and
usually implicit assumptions underlying the "particular universalism" of the
Constitution. The next Part of this Note examines the traces of those
assumptions in the texts constituting the Kir as Joel debate.
IV. TELLING TALES IN (CONSTITUTIONAL) SCHOOL
This Part of the Note examines figures of speech used to mold different
accounts of the Kiryas Joel conflict to varying positions within the spectrum
of constitutional discourse. This shaping process is central to the "'schooling"
of judges, their clerks, law students, and their professors into the constitutional
nomos. This Part will first undertake a broad assessment of this shaping
process, then examine a few key terms more closely. I argue that seemingly
neutral or even sympathetic categorizations of Kiryas Joel assume a general
American community as the standard against which Kiras Joel is to be
judged.
A. Metaphors We Judge by
As contemporary language theory asserts, metaphors and narratives are not
mere ornamentations, but are central to the construction of meaning in and
through language.82 We will therefore miss important aspects of the literature
surrounding Kiryas Joel unless we attend to the way in which the story is told,
the social categories into which the residents are placed, and the images
employed in descriptions of the conflict. In Kiryas Joel, as discussed below,
much turns on the political implications of territorial boundaries presumed to
be neutral.83 Hence analyses of Kiryas Joel frequently involve recourse to
spatial metaphors and narrative models that help structure our conceptions of
the issues involved.
Constitutional debates about religion are often cast against the legendary
background of the Puritan colonists in North America. The Protestant founding
communities explicitly understood themselves as analogous to Israelites, and
thus as being in a "covenantal" relationship vis-,-vis God and each other.
It is easy to connect the Jewish Satmar group as a further link in this chain of
covenantal communities, and there are numerous reasons why it is tempting to
analogize the residents of Kiryas Joel to the Pilgrim migrants to America. The
move of a segment of the Satmar Hasidic community from Williamsburg,
82. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). Haydcn White. The
Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON NARRATIVE I (W.J.T. Mitchell ed.. 1981)
83. See infra Part V.
84. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FA-IH 11 (1988).
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Brooklyn to upstate New York is sometimes referred to as an "exodus."8
Quite different but equally powerful narratives are evoked here-on the one
hand, leaving Babylon (the city), on the other, leaving Egypt for the Promised
Land of Monroe.
Such an association, even if implicit, lends credibility to Abner Greene's
notions of complete exit (exemplified by the Yoder case, which established the
right of Amish parents to keep children out of school) and partial exit (as in
Kiryas Joel) as legitimate grounds for communal autonomy.8 6 At least one
commentator has made the further, and clearly erroneous, association between
Satmar Hasidim and Protestant groups on the basis of Biblical literalism.
87
The connection that makes this a peculiarly American exodus, however, is the
evocation of the Puritan errand into the wilderness88 in search of a place to
be faithful and pure. The model for such an exodus within the American
continent would be Roger Williams, who left to found a new
religious/political/geographic community, made up of people who shared his
dissident faith.89
Martha Minow uses a different spatial metaphor to illustrate why Yoder is
perhaps a less "hard case" than Kiryas Joel. She argues that the Amish
parents' claims to the right to be left alone are congenial to the terms of the
Constitution. For Minow the situation in Yoder "supports an image of Russian
nesting dolls in which each subcommunity fits comfortably within the larger
enclosure of the dominant state." 9 Kiryas Joel, in Minow's view, represents
a conflictual model illustrated by "an image of spinning tops, each pursuing
its own orbit but occasionally running into another, with such collisions setting
each off balance."
91
Yet another spatial metaphor is employed by Nomi Stolzenberg. Drawing
on Emily Dickinson's poem, He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out, Stolzenberg
employs a dynamic metaphor of inclusive and exclusive circles. At the center
of such imaginary circles are the members of either larger and usually
85. Craig L. Olivo, Note, Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School Dist.-When
Neutrality Masks Hostility-The Exclusion of Religious Communities from an Entitlement to Public Schools,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 778 (1993).
86. See infra text accompanying note 108.
87. See Wheeler, supra note 44, at 224 ("They believe in a literal interpretation of the Torah ....").
Literal interpretation of the Torah is disavowed by Rabbinic Judaism, which dictates instead rigorous
reliance on a long tradition of authoritative interpretation. Nor do Christian Fundamentalists necessarily
believe in a literalist reading of the Bible. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me
Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 615
(1993). Yet that misconception seems the most likely source of Wheeler's distortion of the actual statement
in Kiryas Joel: "They interpret the Torah strictly .... Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist.
v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1994).
88. See PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 12 (1956) (explaining that Puritans' "first aim
was ... to realize in America the due form of government, both civil and ecclesiastical").
89. See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 19 (1986) (narrating Roger Williams's departure).
90. Martha Minow, Rights and Cultural Difference, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 347, 357
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
91. Id.
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dominant or smaller and often subordinate groups-e.g., "the people of
Monroe" or "the Satmar Hasidim." In some situations the circles are drawn
large to include even those who do not share the identity at the center of the
circle. In other situations they are drawn narrowly to circumscribe the core
group. When they are large, they can be tolerant ("feel free to join us") or
coercive ("you must become like us"). When small, they may be protective
("leave us to ourselves") or, again, coercive ("you may not go outside"). 92
These spatial metaphors suggest a more nuanced view of group relations
and cast in a new light the insistence in the school district's brief that mixing
with nonreligious children was not "against the religion" of the Satmar
Hasidim.93 Nothing in Biblical or Rabbinic law mandates total segregation
from non-Jews. Yet various Jewish laws, maxims, and customs have been
deployed since Biblical times in order to enforce the cultural boundaries of the
group. Indeed, efforts to minimize contact with non-Jewish culture could
plausibly be claimed as a religious mandate.' Had the case been defended
on free exercise grounds, the claim for such a religious mandate might have
been sound strategy. 95 The failure to make such a claim might have resulted
from the school board's primary concern to fend off an adverse ruling based
on the Establishment Clause. If so, this would also explain the board's
insistence that the children's emotional discomfort in the public schools was
the full reason for legislative action to allow separate public schools for
handicapped children.96 Given that there is a balance of interests and claims
here, if our understandings of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
force a party in a dispute under the religion clauses to distort what the party
wants to say about itself, it becomes harder for a court to resolve a dispute in
a fair and principled way. In other words, it is harder for the court to respond
both to the Constitution and to the needs of citizens.97 Spatialist formalism
92. See Stolzenberg, supra note 87, at 585.
93. See supra text accompanying note 44.
94. See ISRAEL RUBIN, SATMAR: AN ISLAND IN ritE CITY 92-93 (1972)
95. See Stolzenberg, supra note 87, at 601 ("Sherbert and its progen) defined the pressure to act in
violation of a religious command as the paradigmatic free exercise burden,") If this is true, the Kitr'2, Joel
school board might have been well advised to argue that before their school uas set up. parents of children
who required special education were pressured to violate the "religious command" to raise their children
in as exclusively Orthodox an atmosphere as possible. That a plausible cae could be made cithier %%a)
suggests how difficult it is to separate a "command" from a "'preference" in matters of communal religious
culture.
96. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at 4-5. Board of Educ of Ktiras Joel Village
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (Nos. 93-517. 93-529, 93-539)
97. For example, Brownstein discusses the relation between establishment and free exercise in linear
terms, claiming to "attack the problem of finding a middle ground at its roots b) de eloping a doctmnal
foundation for determining when the accommodation of free exercise rights ends and the prohibition of
establishment clause preferences begins." Brownstein, supra note 45. at 90; see also Jonathan E
Nuechterlein, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Permtissible Accommodaton Under the Establishment
Clause, 99 YALE L.J. 1127, 1146 (1990) ("IThe free exercise principle detines the limits of the
anti-establishment principle."). It is equally plausible to speak in terms of "a delicate and clusie balance."
Welton 0. Seal, Jr., Note, "Benevolent Neutrality" Toward Religion: Still an Elusi e Ideal After Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet. 73 N.C. L. REv. 1641. 1641 (1995). rather than tension, but here
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applied to the facts of a given situation is likely to detract from awareness of
the situated and complex nature of identity, an awareness that I claim is
essential to more effective jurisprudence. Objective judicial "equilibrium" is
in any case an impossibility.9"
If in 1791 there was "a general Protestant ethos underlying society,"99 it
is harder to make the claim that a broad Protestant ethos characterizes the
population of the United States at the end of the twentieth century. Hence,
jurisprudence implicitly based on this assumption will inadequately safeguard
the religious freedoms of United States citizens. True, inasmuch as religious
beliefs and practices are founded on inclusions and exclusions, such
jurisprudence can never be perfect. In cases like Yoder and Kiryas Joel, a court
will always have to draw the circle somewhere. Yet it seems that forcing
accounts of Kiryas Joel into categories derived from Protestant religious
experience-such as the Puritan Exodus model discussed above or the notion
of "sect" examined below-limits unnecessarily the possible responses to
forms of difference within a unitary constitutional frame.
B. Sect, Subgroup, and Subcommunity
Consistent with Cover's assertion that meaning is created in language, this
Note assumes that in a broad sense the opinions and surrounding legal
balance and tension effectively function the same way. Both strategies envision the ideal possibility of
specifying that narrow appropriate space wherein the distinction between the realms of the two clauses can
be discerned.
Another dilemma concerning the relation between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses can
be traced at least in part to the individualist bias. It seems natural enough, in a jurisprudence of religion
founded on Protestant experience, to identify the establishment of religion with collectives and free exercise
with individual rights. "Rights of free exercise are quintessentially rights of autonomy .... [They are about]
living in accord with one's deepest presuppositions about humankind and nature." Ira C. Lupu, Free
Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV.
319, 422 (1987). Although Kiryas Joel is neither about "one's ... presuppositions" nor about personal
autonomy, but about a generational community, it is not obvious why we should not view it as raising free
exercise claims. Indeed, it has been suggested that the decision in Kiryas Joel was right as an Establishment
Clause case, but that the case should have been brought as a Free Exercise Clause case. See Schweitzer,
supra note 79, at 1029-30. If so, it is another example of the jurisprudential constraints to which the
representatives of the Village fit their case to their own disadvantage.
Alternatively, free exercise may be associated with "exit" (not in the sense of a literal move away
from society, but in the preservation of religious distinction through social detachment, as in Yoder), while
the attempt by a religious group to retain certain perquisites of "proximity" by obtaining social benefits
available from the government will be considered in the framework of establishment, as in Kiryas Joel. See
Joanne Kuhns, Note, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet: The Supreme
Court Shall Make No Law Defining an Establishment of Religion, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1599, 1665-66 (1995).
This will hardly be a principle adequate to the range of claims adjudicated under the constitutional rubric
of "religion." By declaring what is done away from the broader society (even by a collective) as "private"
free exercise, and what is done in interaction with the broader society as "establishment," it essentially
extends outward the Protestant notion of the freedom of individual, private conscience.
98. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Adding Complexity to Confusion and Seeing the Light: Feminist Legal
Insights and the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 137, 169 (1995)
("Because the line between lifting a burden and conferring a benefit depends so crucially upon perspective,
the line serves as an unreliable and inappropriate measure of the constitutionality of government action.").
99. Berg, supra note 5, at 442.
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discussions of Kiryas Joel are the case. As discussed in the next Part of this
Note, a good deal of the judicial and scholarly discussion of the case hinges
on the putative neutrality of the criteria by which the Village and school
district were established. t°° The putatively neutral categories used to describe
the Kiryas Joel Satmar as a group require a similar examination. Here, I argue
that the seemingly neutral terms "sect," "subgroup," and "subcommunity"
betray an assumption that citizens should identify primarily as "individual
Americans."
Justice Souter's opinion begins quite carefully, merely referring to the
Satmar Hasidim as "practitioners of a strict form of Judaism...... Later in the
opinion, however, he refers to them as a "sect."' o2 This terminology is
echoed in the various student-written pieces on Kiryas Joel and on
Gruniet. t°3 Why this term should seem apt is not immediately evident. Its
definition in the American Heritage Dictionary emphasizes distinctness within
a larger group, religious character, and shared interests or beliefs, and traces
the term to the Latin secta, meaning "course, [or] school of thought.""'t
Roget's 21st Century Thesaurus confirms the intellectual and religious
emphases of the term.' Both of these definitions rely on the notion of a
religious group as a set of otherwise autonomous individuals coming together
in shared faith. Nothing in them suggests the likelihood of kinship bonds
among members of "sects." Nothing about "subgroup," "subcommunity," or
"sect" adequately suggests the genealogical ties that are crucial to maintaining
a diasporic communal ,romos.' 06
100. See infra Part V.
101. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. %. Grumet. 114 S Ct 2481. 2484 (114)
102. Id. at 2492.
103. See Kuhns, supra note 97, at 1599: Seal. stipra note 97. at 1642; Schetitzcr. supra note 79. at
1007; Wheeler, supra note 44, at 223 ("TMe Satmar are the most ascetic sect of the Hasidim .')
Thomas, supra note 4, at 532, refers to the community as "the Satmarer Hasidim. a sect of the JestIsh
faith." He continues: "The Satmarer, in addition to separation from an outside communit . practice
separation between sects [sic] and follow a male and female dress code. Radio. .iston 5icl. and
publications in English are not widely used." Id. at 532-33. The substitution of "'sects" for "'scxes" and of
"vision" for "television" are obviously copyediting errors, not ethnographic inaccuracies Ne' enheless. the
fact that they slipped through the article's editing process suggests that a canned, sound-bite like descnption
of the Satmar Hasidim has been formulated. Similarly noteworthy is Acklm's reference to the Village itself
as a (presumably collective) religious actor: "The Village of Kiryas Joel (Village). a religious enclave of
Satmar Hasidim, practices a strict form of Judaism." Ackln. supra note 4. at 43. Budding legal scholars'
reliance on outmoded ethnographies may be the cause of other distortions, such as the claim that "the
Satmar Hasidic sect ... eschew all modem conveniences such as . . cars." Laura M Hempen. Note,
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet: Accommodattonusts Strike a Blow to the Wall
of Separation, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1389, 1403 (1995), and the exotic suggestion that the) are "considered
strangers even in the Jewish community . I..." d.
104. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1232 (3d ed. 1993).
105. See ROGET'S 21sT CENTURY THESAURUS 742 (Barbara Ann Kipfer ed.. 1992)
106. Even Souter's initial reference to the Satmar as practitioners of strct Judaism ma) be misleading.
insofar as it may be taken to mean that Satmar is a subset of the "Jewish faith." Describing the Satmar
nomos as a form of "Judaism" might imply a particular heightened standing for other groups designating
themselves as "Jewish" when appearing as amici in a case involving Satmar Hasidtm As suggested abose.
much of the liberal Jewish organizations' motivation can be explained by their conttnuing belief that a state
truly respectful of individual rights is the best guarantor of the safety of peoples such as Jess. That belief
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The title of Martha Minow's article, The Constitution and the Subgroup
Question,0 7 suggests her intention to place the case in the context of Jewish
"minority" status. As her prefatory thumbnail sketch of Jewish history
suggests, Jews seem to be a sort of paradigm "subgroup" for her, and she
states that her title is meant "to allude ... to the phrase, 'The Jewish
Question."' '° More generally, Minow's account suggests that "Americans,"
that group constituted by the Constitution, are the primary group with respect
to whom the residents of Kiryas Joel might appear as a subgroup. Minow's
phrase is troubling, for in marking only the "subgroup" for question, it may
leave the impression that this larger group may be taken for granted as sharing
a normative identity that makes them American. If the group is "Americans"
and subgroups are subject to question, are they part of the group or not? The
use of the term "subgroup" effectively undermines Minow's stated goal of
explaining the background to Kiryas Joel from the subgroup's own perspective.
In suggesting that its members are less than fully members of the group,
Minow's use of "subgroup" betrays a subtle and doubtless inadvertent
assimilationist bias.
Christopher Eisgruber, responding to Abner Greene's essay in defense of
the right to partial exit, relies on a claim of American collective identity as a
positive social phenomenon that the Constitution is designed to foster. Because
he believes that collective identity is sustained in part by challenges to its own
self-justification, he finds that the Constitution has a place for what he calls
"sub-communities."10 9 The place normative constitutionalism grants to
subcommunities is, in Eisgruber's view, therefore dependent on those
subcommunities' ability to provoke reflective self-questioning within the
constitutional polity: "[B]ecause reflective constitutionalism is self-critical
about the good, it values such sub-communities as sources of dissent and
respects them as sincere efforts to pursue a vision of the good that might, after
all, prove correct."' 0 Eisgruber forces all distinctive groups into the model
of principled dissenters. This is particularly unfortunate for the evaluation of
is not necessarily shared by diasporist-integrist Jewish communities like Satmar. Such communities are less
likely to share general liberal assumptions about a tendency toward increasing rationalization of society and
increasing recognition of human and civil rights, and partly for that reason, they are less likely to make
Kantian or Rawlsian investments in a vision of the general good. Given that the dispute concerned the
putative establishment of religion by the small and local group of Satmar Hasidim in Kiryas Joel, it is
worth recalling that while even the name of Satmar reflects particularity rather than any universal
pretensions, the names of the liberal organizations imply generality and hence a greater tendency toward
the articulation of nationwide norms regarding religion.
The list of joint filers of one of the amicus briefs illustrates this universalist tendency. See Brief
Amicus Curiae of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, American Jewish Committee, Anti-
Defamation League, American Civil Liberties Union, National Council of Jewish Women, and the Unitarian
Universalist Association, In Support of Respondents, Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (Nos. 93-517, 93-529, 93-539).
107. Minow, supra note 6.
108. Id. at I.
109. Eisgruber, supra note 8, at 91.
110. Id.
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the Satmar Hasidim. They are more interested in carrying out a contract that
they believe their ancestors made with God than in promoting the universal
correctness of their "vision of the good." Given Eisgruber's criteria, it is not
clear why the United States should accommodate groups "which, like the
Satmars or the Amish, reject[] principles of justice fundamental to the
American regime...... If subcommunities are to be tolerated only because of
the benefits they provide to an invigorated constitutionalism, they may be
subtly but inevitably forced to present themselves and to understand themselves
on the terms of the putative general community. Eisgruber may endorse such
a process, yet even on his own terms, the pressure of assimilation diminishes
the space available for the dissent whose challenge he values.
Ira Lupu employs the notion of subcommunities as well, but questions
whether such subcommunities are really governed by the integrity of an
internal nomos. Unlike Eisgruber's by now more conventional association of
the Satmar Hasidim and the Amish, Lupu analogizes Kirvas Joel not only to
Bob Jones University, but to much more ominous names in the news. Thus
Lupu claims that Greene's analysis is not helpful with regard to "the sort of
problems presented by Kiryas Joel, Bob Jones Universit. the Waco Branch
Davidians, the Montana Militia, and the myriad sub-communities to which it
might be applied."'"12 Here "sub-community" acquires some of the same
negative connotations as does "sect." Consistent with Lupu's title, Uncovering
the Village of Kirvas Joel, the subcommunity here seems almost beneath
community, surreptitious, underground. In fact, the ominous connotations of
sectarianism" 3 and the actuality of bitter struggles within Kiryas Joel are at
the heart of Lupu's article."' Lupu argues that "the structure of authority in
the Village presented an unusually high risk of unconstitutional governance.
So uncovered, the Village appears to be a poor candidate for the dual rule of
nomic community and repository of state power.""'4  Lupu means to
demystify the idea of the Satmar "nomos." His title thus represents a complex
pun. At one level, it has an aggressively investigative connotation. Lupu
purports to dig beneath the surface of the official court representation of the
issues, bringing in the "dirt" about the heart of darkness constituting Kiryas
Joel's undemocratic structure. Lupu also aims to dispel Justice Scalia's
Ill. Id.
112. Lupu, supra note 9, at 109-10.
113. These connotations may be seen in the lists of terms associated %%ith the noun form of sectanan.
"'person who is narrow-minded" ("adherent, bigot. cohort. disciple. dissenter. dissident, dogmatist. cxtremist.
fanatic, henchman/woman, heretic, maverick, misbele'er nonconformist. partisan. radical, rebel.
revolutionary, satellite, schismatic, separatist, supporter, true beliczer zealot") and wsith the adjcctt',c form
of sectarian, "narrow-minded, exclusive" ("bigoted. clannish. cliquish, dissident. docinnaire. dogmatic.
factional, fanatic, fanatical, hidebound. insular, limited. local. nonconforming, nonconformist, parochial.
partisan, provincial, rigid, schismatic, skeptical. small-town, splinter"). ROGEr's 21sr CE1'LtRY
THESAURUS, supra note 105, at 742.
114. Lupu, supra note 9.
115. Id. at 104-05.
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suggestion that it is ludicrous to think of the Satmar Hasidim as enjoying
anything like the degree of power that could make them likely candidates for
the establishment of religion.'t 6 Responding to Scalia, Lupu stresses that
Hasidic Jews are a well-organized "non-ideological swing vote group" that was
well-connected to the administration of Governor Mario Cuomo."7
Ultimately, Lupu aims to demystify the more romantic readings of Cover's
original idea of "nomic communities." Thus Lupu suspects "that so-called
nomic communities are likely to reveal a high frequency of
constitution-flouting.""..8 That is, the nomos may be nefarious.
Doubtless he is correct on this point. Cover himself acknowledged that
Jewish communities in diaspora have perpetuated themselves partly through the
deployment of forms of coercion, albeit forms short of the state power for
which he reserved the term "violence."'"19 Speculations about the frequency
of Constitution-flouting should not determine the constitutionality of granting
different governmental powers to different kinds of communities. Actual
violations of voting rights or free speech should be dealt with by ordinary
police powers. This is the mechanism dictated by the balance in the United
States between state police powers and the range of relations between politics
and identities. 20 If metaphors constitute meaningful language, we must be
116. Here at least, Justice Scalia rhetorically adopted the "Satmarer perspective":
The Grand Rebbe [Joel Teitelbaum] would be astounded to learn that after escaping brutal
persecution and coming to America with the modest hope of religious toleration for their ascetic
form of Judaism, the Satmar had become so powerful, so closely allied with Mammon, as to
have become an "establishment" of the Empire State.
Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2506 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
117. Lupu, supra note 9, at 118. Lupu links Cuomo's support for the creation of the Village school
district and Cuomo's support for "a taxpayer-financed 'bereavement fund' for the Crown Heights Hasidic
community after the death of its revered Rebbe, Menachem Schneerson." Id. Only from the outside is it
plausible to characterize the Lubavitch community in Crown Heights and the Satmarers of Williamsburg
or Kiryas Joel as part of a single "Hasidic community." Minow is aware of the rift between Satmar and
Lubavitch. She suggests that "given the historical tensions between the Satmar and Lubavitch Hasidic
communities, an intriguing experiment in integration would bring Lubavitch children with disabilities into
the Kiryas Joel public school." Minow, supra note 6, at 23. There is something repugnantly unrealistic
about Minow's suggestion. Such an experiment might be "intriguing," but it might well be a painful failure.
Were I a Satmar or a Lubavitch parent, I would not readily volunteer my disabled child as a subject of such
an experiment. One may share the values of integration and inclusion, yet question here (as I also do
regarding Justice Stevens's dissent) why children with disabilities should be the subject of such experiments
merely because they are entitled to and need state services. See infra text accompanying note 163.
118. Lupu, supra note 9, at 112. Lupu acknowledges that such extra-record considerations should not
have influenced the Supreme Court's decision. See id.
119. ROBERT COVER, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, iz NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 239, 242 (1993). The recent case of apparent arson at a maternity-convalescent
center in Kiryas Joel run by the dissident faction might have given even Cover pause. See Robert Hanley,
In the Ashes of Arson at Kiryas Joel, Tensions of Bitter Factionalism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1996, at B I.
120. Unlike Justice Scalia's summary dismissal of the notion that a group like the Satmar Hasidim
could "establish" religion in America, Judge Bellacosa of the New York Court of Appeals noted carefully
in his dissent there that "no claim is made of any alleged restrictive covenants among the village's property
owners, or of any alleged irregularity in the conduct of municipal or school district elections .... " Grumet
v. Board of Educ., 618 N.E.2d 94, 113 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). One might say Justice
Bellacosa was being obtuse or formalistic. I am suggesting that how to deal with such claims may depend
substantially, and legitimately, on how and where they are raised. See Berg, supra note 5, at 488 n.249
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careful of the metaphors we use. Here at least the "uncovering" pun has lead
Lupu's conception astray.
The emphasis on metaphors and categories in this Part of the Note is not
meant to suggest that such terms and phrases uniquely or ultimately determine
judicial or scholarly opinions. They range widely from overt suspicion of the
Kiryas Joel setup to frank sympathy for the "right to be different." Yet all of
them cast the Kiryas Joel community in some sort of "sub-," secondary status
vis-a-vis the normative group putatively governed by and faithful to the
Constitution. The term "sect," even where it is not pejorative, focuses on the
feature of individual belief and occludes the genealogical dynamic, while
"subgroup" and "subcommunity" imply "outsider" status. Whether to keep
them out or pull them in, these categories draw subtly coercive circles.
V. DIFFERENT ESTABLISHMENTS
This Part of the Note examines the apparent discrepancy between the
creation of the Village of Kiryas Joel, which all judges and commentators
agree is constitutionally permissible, and the creation of the Kiryas Joel school
district, which is thoroughly controversial. Here I question the presumption of
politically neutral territory to suggest that the establishment of the Village may
have more complex implications than the literature has yet acknowledged. I
likewise point out that the suppression of genealogy in constitutional discourse
leads in effect to the recoding of genealogy as "'race," which may make the
establishment of the school district considerably more troubling than it need
or should be.
The relation between the establishment of the Village and of the school
district is discussed in Justice Souter's opinion for the Court. Souter
distinguishes the creation of the Kiryas Joel district from two related and
permissible processes. On one hand, -[t]he district in this case is
distinguishable from one whose boundaries are derived according to neutral
historical and geographic criteria, but whose population happens to comprise
coreligionists."' 21 On the other, the creation of the district "contrasts with the
process by which the Village of Kiryas Joel itself was created, involving, as
it did, the application of a neutral state law designed to give almost any group
of residents the right to incorporate."''22 Yet these two statements appear to
contradict one another. If the Village was created in accord with a "'neutral
('"he proper action would have been to sue to enjoin the coercive actions. not to strike dowsn an
independent piece of legislation that is secular on its face and in its operation.**). After all. .hile the
commitment of nomic communities to American constitutionalism may be questioned. it is a settled
principle of Jewish diasporic communities that dina de-malkhuta dmna--4he law of the state is [bindingl law
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE BABA BATHRA 54b.
121. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491 n.6.
122. Id. at 2491 n.7.
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state law" and the school district conforms to the boundaries of the Village,
how do the boundaries of the district differ from "boundaries ... derived
according to neutral . . . criteria"? To see how this contradiction could pass
unnoticed in Justice Souter's opinion, we must look more carefully at the
implicit concepts governing the different views of the establishment of the
Village and of the school district.
A. Establishment of the Village
Individual and territorial notions of the relation between space and identity
are at the base of the amici briefs filed against the school district by several
liberal Jewish organizations. It is generally understood that such organizations
pursue a legal agenda of the strictest separation of church and state, on the
premise that any weakening of the constitutional ban against religious
establishments, even in favor of a minority group, is likely to inure sooner or
later to the general detriment of religious minorities. These organizations may
also have been less sympathetic to the Satmar Hasidim in general because of
the Satmarers' reputation for standoffishness vis- -vis other Jews.'23
Remembering that these Jewish organizations argued against the Village should
make us wary of claims that the Court evidences "hostility" toward religion in
general.' 24
The liberal Jewish organizations, like everyone else, jumped on the
bandwagon too late. For those concerned with religious establishment, the
litigation over the special school district in Kiryas Joel really should have
followed the litigation over the establishment of the Village. 25 As Richard
Ford has recently suggested, local municipal lines and school districts should
be held to the same standard of constitutional scrutiny: "For example, if the
states are not free to establish a system of segregated schools, they should not
be allowed to accomplish the same objective by delegating state power to
segregated localities."' 126 The problems inherent in the establishment of the
Village of Kiryas Joel were politically invisible because of our political
culture's habitual failure to consider local space as a politically contingent
issue, rather than a given fact of nature.
27
123. Aloofness has been part of the public depiction of the Satmar Hasidim in America at least since
the publication of RUBIN, supra note 94.
124. Hence the title of Olivo, supra note 85; see also Acklin, supra note 4, at 59 ("As the noted case
illustrates, the Court's professed 'neutrality' has resulted in hostility towards religion.").
125. Judge Bellacosa argued that if the Village was constitutional, so was the district. See Grumet v.
Board of Educ., 618 N.E.2d 94, 113 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
126. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107
HARV. L. REv. 1841, 1865 (1994). Ford makes the same point that Judge Bellacosa did in Grwnmet-that
municipal and school district boundaries should be held to the same standard-but to opposite effect.
127. See id. at 1857-60.
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It is true that the primary motivation for the original establishment of the
separate Village of Kiryas Joel in 1979 rested on nothing so lofty as a desire
for a pure and separate existence. 2s Rather, the issues were quite mundane,
centering on taxation, concentration of extended families in areas with
single-family zoning, and the proximity of houses of worship to residential
areas. 129 These issues are not inherent to any religious separatism but do
have much to do with genealogy, given the tendency of Hasidic families to
live in multigenerational households and to have numerous children per
married couple. The practice of holding prayer services in houses (and the
taxation disputes that may arise therefrom) likewise demonstrate the actual
inseparability of "religion" from genealogy and ethnicity for a group like the
Satmar Hasidim.
These mundane issues show that, while spatial metaphors may be powerful
ways of talking about identity, space is more than just a metaphor. Diaspora
is not a nonspatial existence, but a concrete relation between genealogy and
space. Ironically, the residents of Kiryas Joel seceded because their land-use
patterns were like those that, in the general secession case, we would expect
a group to secede in order to avoid-land-use patterns engaged in by poor
people and their lower ratio of tax input to service demands.'"
Nevertheless, the successive organization of the neighborhood, Village, and
school district of Kiryas Joel (whatever the external constraints) have plausibly
been construed as a form of social "exit." Abner Greene thus sees Kiras Joel
as exemplifying the problem of "'partial exit.' The ... problem arises when
a group of like-minded people leaves one geographical location for a new
place, establishes a set of private institutions, and also seeks the accoutrements
of governmental power for its new community."' 3' Greene suggests that exit
is indicative of commitments,' 32 so partial exit might imply less than total
128. See Robert A. Destro, "By What Right?". The Sources and Dnts of Federal Court and
Congressional Jurisdiction over Matters "Touching Religion ". 29 IND L Ra, I. 61 11995) (explaining
that Satmars, unlike Amish. "clustered in urban neighborhoods and did not hesitate to call upon the local
community for the goods and services they needed").
129. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet. 114 S. C1. 2481. 2495-96 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); see also MINT., supra note 14. at 207-08 ("'e belicse ve are complying %ith
the law. Our family units are large and closely knit, leaving understandable doubt by those %%ho do not
know us and our customs.'") (quoting Kiryas Joel resident Lctbush Lfkoitz).
An instructive comparison is the establishment of the Village of Airmoni in recent Nears out of a
portion of the Town of Ramapo in Rockland County'. New York. by an association of homeoancrs
(including a number of non-Orthodox Jewish members) concerned about Ramapo's adoption of zoning
measures favorable to Hasidic Jews. including "multiple-family housing in areas zoned for single family
residences ... [and] the allowance of home synagogues ('shteebles') in residential areas"
LeBlanc-Stemberg v. Fletcher, 922 F. Supp. 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
130. Cf. Ford, supra note 126, at 1870-71; see also supra note 129
131. Greene, supra note 7, at 4-5.
132. See id. at 50; see also James E. Fleming. Securing Deliberative Autonomv. 48 STA.% L RE%, I.
56 (1995) (explaining that in earlier American model of literal group removal to frontier. "it %.as typicall)
the denial of such significant liberties, not trivial ones. that prompted individuals and groups to pull up
stakes and 'exit' to the frontier"). If so, perhaps there is an inclinatton to give more leeway to practices
exercised as part of complete exit. Partial exit might be suspect in its motives- Are these people trying to
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commitment.
The mundane issues leading to the creation of the Village of Kiryas Joel
help make it clear that it is not simply "religious" separation that is at issue
here. This point, however, does not necessarily confirm Justice Scalia's
argument that the creation of the Village constituted "a classic drawing of lines
on the basis of communality of secular governmental desires."'33 The
mundane issues do not necessarily imply the absence of concerns we would
commonly designate as religious. Ford's diagnosis of the blind spots in
constitutional jurisprudence and scholarship stemming from our common
naturalization of territory and geography' 34 suggests that here, reading back
from the fact that there was a village leads to the presumption that its
foundation must have had a religiously neutral, "secular" basis. True, unlike
the school district, the Village "was formed pursuant to a religion-neutral self-
incorporation statute."' 35 Again, however, the relative ease by which a
municipality can be established suggests a low level of concern for the
differential political impact on different groups of citizens of the redrawing of
local political boundaries.1
36
B. Establishment of the School District
One of the complicating aspects of Kiryas Joel is that religious
establishment and equal protection issues appear to be closely intertwined in
the case.'37 The vocabulary of judges and constitutional scholars lacks a
concept like that of genealogy, in which rhetoric and institutions of kinship are
inseparable from the biology of reproduction. For these lawyers' nomos, any
determination of a personal identity by descent is easily seen as "racist." This
conflation of genealogy with race prevents a sympathetic perception of
descent-based identities as a strategy of diasporic continuity. 38 Thus the
separation of the Hasidic school children inevitably comes to be seen as
analogous to an acceptable or unacceptable form of racial segregation.
Justice Kennedy draws on the legacy of equal protection decisions in
distinguishing between the creation of the Village and that of the school
district, according to an implicit criterion of state action.' 39 On the one hand
get something for nothing?
133. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Seal, supra note 97, at 1668.
134. See Ford, supra note 126, at 1888-92.
135. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136. Ford paraphrases the holding of Wright v. Coutncil of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), "that local
officials could be enjoined from carving a new school district from an existing district that had not yet been
desegregated." Ford, supra note 126, at 1905-06.
137. The parallels between these two areas of jurisprudence are noted by Minow, supra note 6, at 15
n.73.
138. See Boyarin & Boyarin, supra note 66, at 717.
139. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The Constitution confers upon no individual the
right to demand action by the state which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to others.").
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he describes the process by which "voluntary association ... leads to a
political community comprised of people who share a common religious
faith. ' "' He contrasts this to the enactment of state legislation having the
same result: "[G]overnment [may not] use religion as a line-drawing
criterion .... In this respect, the Establishment Clause mirrors the Equal
Protection Clause."'' Justice Kennedy's analogy is somewhat misleading.
In equal protection cases, the line is not drawn between "voluntary" and
"governmental" actions, but between private and state actions. The creation of
the Kiryas Joel school district, while pursuant to a governmental action,
nevertheless was carried out consistent with the will of the majority of Kiryas
Joel residents and in that sense may be said to have been "voluntary" on their
part.'4 2 On the other hand, even if government's role in the creation of the
Village was essentially nondiscriminatory, the establishment of the Village was
hardly a private action. The analogy to Shelley it Kraemer thus works neither
to "exonerate" the Village nor to "convict" the school district.
Equal protection analogies are also at the heart of Abner Greene's
argument for the constitutionality of the Kiryas Joel arrangement. Greene
suggests that Kiryas Joel is consistent with the fact pattern ruled on by the
Supreme Court in Keyes v. School District No. 1" and Milliken it
Bradley:'44  "[I]f private citizens move to relatively homogeneous
140. Kiryas Joel. 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Kennedy, J.. concumng).
141. Id. (Kennedy. J.. concurring). As pointed out by Berg. supra note 5. at 489. the reference to
electoral lines entails an analogy to the previous term's decision in Shaw %-. Reno. 113 S Ct 2816 (1993)
Berg argues the importance of Kennedy's failure to point out
that the special school district fell within the guidelines of Shaw. The New York legislature
drew a district that was compact and contiguous, reflecting the lines of an existing political
subdivision, the village. If Shaw is taken seriously, those facts should be cructial Shais rests on
and redoubles the commitment that the primary guideline for districting in America should be
geography, that is, the location where people choose to live
Berg, supra note 5, at 492. The last sentence here relies on the assumption that people's geographical
situation, as a matter of choice, is the principle determinant of their political identity In support of the
localist principle, Abner Greene draws on Michael Walzer's argument that since "-politics is always
territorially based .... [tlhe democratic school, then. should be an enclosure within a neighborhood a
special environment within a known world, where children are brought together as students esactly as they
will one day come together as citizens."' Greene. supra note 7. at 50 (quoting MICIAEL WALZEt. SPHERES
OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 225 (1983)). Greene's reliance on "exit" allows him
to have his cake and eat it too; for Greene. once a group of people has sufficiently demonstrated its
commitment to its separate group existence by physical removal. it should be allowed social separatism as
well. What troubles one respondent to Greene in particular, and more generally motiatis those troubled
by the implications of the Kiryas Joel district, is precisely the fear that those schooled parochially wkill.
when they become adults, only "come together as citizens" for the furtherance of parochial interests See
generally Eisgruber, supra note 8.
142. Would the establishment of a separate village withstand a constitutional test if it appeared patently
designed to establish an "all-white" municipality in part of a preexisting municipality already disided into
black and white neighborhoods? That is. how far does the right of "'almost any group" to create its own
village extend? Applying Justice Kennedy's analogy from the requirement for state action in equal
protection cases to cases involving religious establishment to this hypothetical might suggest that under
New York's law, the "voluntary" separation of a group of white citizens would be upheld, regardless of
racist intent.
143. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
144. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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neighborhoods, government is not required to draw school attendance zones
across neighborhoods."' 4 5 Greene assumes that municipal boundaries should
not be taken as evidence of intent to segregate. 46 However, in his very next
sentence, Greene quotes the Court's statement in Keyes that the distinction
between impermissible de jure and permissible de facto segregation is
"'purpose or intent to segregate."", 147 It is by no means clear that the racial
divisions across municipal boundaries in Milliken, for example, pass this
"intent" test. Territory and geography should not be presumed to be socially
neutral or "noninvidious." In any case, even if separation is not an essential
tenet of Satmar beliefs, it would be disingenuous to claim that the Kiryas Joel
community did not "intend" to "segregate" its children from non-Hasidic
children. Kiryas Joel would fail the "intent" test, since the desire to maintain
an integral community underlies the series of legal maneuvers involved. Thus
the constitutionality of the Kiryas Joel school board is not best defended by
analogy to Milliken and Keyes.
This Part of the Note has claimed that supposedly neutral territorial
divisions are actually rife with political significance. The constitutional
question concerning the establishment of Kiryas Joel Village is intimately tied
to the corresponding question concerning the school district. At the same time,
distinguishing genealogy as a strategy of cultural maintenance from the racial
discrimination known in United States history suggests that the district should
not be defended on the basis of decisions such as Keyes and Milliken, nor
should the district be suspect by analogy to racial segregation. At this point,
we finally reach the question of the well-being of the children who receive
special education in Kiryas Joel.
VI. SHOULD SPECIAL CHILDREN MAKE HARD CASES?
As noted above, a diasporic and genealogical community that finds itself
litigating constitutional rights may not be interested primarily in the
constitutional principles involved. Likewise, legal debates about constitutionally
permissible education may not have the children in mind. This Part of the Note
describes the debate over special education in Kiryas Joel in terms of a
changing conception of genealogy within the Hasidic community. At the same
time, it points out how this context was inevitably obscured in court papers
conforming to individualist and territorialist notions of identity.
Whatever segregation obtains between the municipalities of Kiryas Joel
and Monroe or between the school districts of Kiryas Joel and
145. Greene, supra note 7, at 33.
146. See id. at 42 n.165 ("I agree that the legislature may not district in such a way as to ensure
segregated public schools-unless such distancing can legitimately be said to respond to a noninvidious
category, which (centrally for my argument) includes geography.").
147. Id. at 33 n.138 (quoting Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208).
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Monroe-Woodbury is not solely the result of the voluntary political withdrawal
of the residents of Kiryas Joel. Thomas Berg correctly notes that, after the
Supreme Court decisions in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball' and
Aguilar v. Felton'49 cast doubt on the arrangement by which special
education services had been provided by public school teachers at Kiryas Joel
religious schools,
[t]he [Monroe-Woodbury] district then turned recalcitrant. It refused
to offer classes elsewhere in the village, even though the Supreme
Court had approved such programs at "a neutral site off the premises
of [religious] schools," and instead required the Kiryas Joel children
to come into the public schools for their tutoring.'
Christopher Eisgruber also notes that this option was available to the
Monroe-Woodbury School District, but then goes on immediately to claim that
it was "[t]he Kiryas Joel School District [sic] [that] refused to offer such
classes."' 5 ' Indeed, Berg is almost alone among commentators in mentioning
the "recalcitrance" of the Monroe-Woodbury district in his narrative of the
case. 1
52
The recalcitrance of the Monroe-Woodbury administrators lends credence
to the claim on behalf of Kiryas Joel that when the handicapped students of
Kiryas Joel were forced to attend special education classes in
Monroe-Woodbury public schools, they suffered "'panic, fear and trauma...
in leaving their own community and being with people whose ways were so
different."' 153 Generally the legal commentaries, regardless of their ultimate
stance on the constitutionality of the district, accept at face value the Kiryas
Joel residents' claim that the unfeasibility of having Hasidic handicapped
children attend class with public school children was attendant on outside
discrimination."
The stated objections to sending the Kiryas Joel handicapped children to
Monroe-Woodbury public schools thus emphasize the external barriers faced
by those children; in Stolzenberg's formulation, these barriers were the "circle
148. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
149. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
150. Berg, supra note 5, at 436-37 (quoting Wolman v. Walter. 433 US. 229. 248 (1977)) Ilirst
alteration added).
151. Eisgruber, supra note 8. at 93 n.37. This cannot be correct, since at this time there ias no Kiryas
Joel School District. Presumably this was a copyediting error.
152. But see Destro, supra note 128, at 61 (reporting that Monroe-Woodbury distrct "felt constrained"
not to accommodate).
153. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Gnimet. 114 S. Ct. 2481. 2485 (1994)
(quoting Board of Educ. of the Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. ,ieder. 527 N-E 2d 767. 770 (N Y
1988)).
154. See, e.g., Eisgruber, supra note 8. at 94 (accepting this claim despite recognition of some
equivocation in record on whether or not Satmar is per se separatist): Greene. supra note 7. at 41 (accepting
this claim despite his emphasis on overall Satmar community's "partial exit"). Lupu. supra note 9. at 117
n.56 (accepting this claim despite his general lack of sympathy for Satmar "separatism")
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that shut [the children] out."'5 5 Evidently this was consistent with the
Village's strategy of de-emphasizing separatism as a Satmar tenet. It is difficult
to believe, however, that the Satmar parents did not want to keep the children
in the community. Indeed, it cannot be stressed enough how these children's
"specialness" places them "at the mercy" of the Satmar community, and the
state and public school officials. Attention to the needs of handicapped
children, rather than a general tendency to hide them as an embarrassment and
a potential bar to the marriage possibilities of other family members, is a
relatively recent phenomenon in Hasidic communities.'56 Handicaps are a
stigma in society at large. If anything, they are an even greater stigma in
communities obsessed with genealogy and everything that genealogy
represents: the possibility of improving social standing through strategic links
of extended families in marriage; the "quality" of a given person's ancestry as
a valid aspect of that person's own value; the imperative to be fruitful with its
attendant emphasis on healthy, capable children who will themselves become
fully participating and valued members of the community.
The fight for special education under appropriate terms should thus be seen
not simply as a dispute over how to handle needs the existence of which is
taken for granted, but rather as part of a growing acknowledgment within the
Hasidic community itself. 157 The problems of handicapped children are still
enmeshed within a genealogical conception of identity, but whereas these
children were once hidden away for fear of "tainting" the family, now they are
more fully included as among the fruits of generation. 58 The community has
increasingly been drawing a circle to keep these children in. The need for state
support for special education, and its availability on terms other than those
dictated solely by parents within the Hasidic community, made it vastly more
complicated to act upon the growing acknowledgment of the value and special
needs of handicapped children. Already stigmatized for their handicap, could
they be forced to undergo the extra stigmatization that would surely attend
their regular exposure to the secular community, an exposure shared by none
of their fellow children? This extra dimension of internal stigmatization
155. Stolzenberg, supra note 87, at 581.
156. See MINT_ supra note 14, at 310-13. This book contains a clear narrative overview of the
establishment of Kiryas Joel and of the school controversy. Generally there has been a dramatic expansion
of schools and other institutions providing special education services in Hasidic and other Orthodox
communities.
157. Minow acknowledges that "[diefining inclusion in public education for children with disabilities
takes a different form ... than inclusion for racial minorities." Minow, supra note 6, at 18. She fails to
recognize that the very existence of a debate among Kiryas Joel residents about how best to provide special
education represents a massive step 'toward inclusion.
158. See MIN'rz, supra note 14, at 217 ("'[Formerly] [t]hey kept these kids at home because they were
worried about the marriages they would have to do with the rest of the children'--that is, developmental
problems in one child were hidden for fear of harming other children's marriage prospects.) (quoting
informant "AG"). But see id. at 228 ("'[Now] [t]here is an increasing effort at early detection, treating and
providing services to those children who have what are viewed as . . . varying developmental
disabilities ....') (quoting Dr. Harvey Kranzler).
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compounds the "panic, fear and trauma" at the hands of other public school
children explicitly alluded to in the court papers.'59 The brief for the school
board, itself consistent with the individualist tenets of First Amendment
jurisprudence, could not express how important separate special education was
for the purpose of fostering the inclusion of these children within the Kiryas
Joel community.
Recognition of this dilemma is relevant to understanding the position of
the dissenting group of Kiryas Joel residents. This faction's original and
continuing motivation was loyalty to the ways of the deceased Reb Joel
Teitelbaum. Their stance in the school board dispute took the form of active
resistance to the education of Kiryas Joel's handicapped children under any
secular state auspices, and was expressed in an amicus brief against the school
board.16 Almost none of the parents of handicapped children in Kiryas Joel
found it possible to continue sending their child to a "mixed" public school.
The dissident group within Kiryas Joel further objected to separating the
handicapped children within a public school, whose curriculum had no
religious character, even though that school consisted solely of children from
Ha-idic families. The separate school district arrangement still resulted in the
education of handicapped children according to substantially different cultural
values than those governing the education of their nonhandicapped peers, and
this dilemma fostered a sharp division of views on the best way to maintain
the Satmar community in diaspora. Sending children to the secular school
district thus potentially risks a milder version of the exposure to double
internal stigmatization I have just identified with regard to the sending of
handicapped children to "mixed" public schools.'
6'
Leonard Levy, commenting on the New York Court of Appeals ruling in
Grumet, argues that the question of the children's best interests should have
been paramount in the decision, yet it was not. 62 In the context of this
dispute, the best interests of the children were to be sought within an
arrangement keeping them within the Satmar community as much as possible.
Justice Stevens expresses concern for the children in his concurrence, but not
on terms we would expect from the considerations I have just outlined. Stevens
159. See supra text accompanying note 153.
160. Brief of the Committee for the Well-Being of Kiryas Joel. Board of Educ of Kiryas Joel Village
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (Nos. 93-517. 93-527. 93-539). The Committee "represents
over 500 members of the Satmar Jewish community of Kiryas Joel who support the decision below " Id
at i.
161. Minow points out that "[a]dvocates for disability rights might cnticize the Village of Kiryas Joel
for failing to provide inclusion or appropriate education for their disabled children within their own private.
religious schools." Minow, supra note 6, at 19. Perhaps the majority of parents in the Village would prefer
to take government money and use it for special education within the yeshivas. thus promoting "inclusion"
and "mainstreaming" of handicapped children within their home community. This the Village cannot do.
Again, what the Kiryas Joel dissenters object to are the constraints placed on the education of handicapped
Hasidic children who benefit from state funding.
162. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AM."ENDtENT
256 (2d ed. 1994).
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argues that the "panic, fear and trauma" of the students in the mixed public
schools could have been alleviated by the state's taking steps to "teach[ ] their
schoolmates to be tolerant and respectful of Satmar customs."'63 Aside from
the practical doubt about whether such hypothetical "steps" would be effective,
this recommendation once again ignores the double stigma placed on
handicapped Hasidic children attending outside public schools. In any event,
it appears that the main aspect of the children's welfare about which Justice
Stevens is concerned is that of "associating with their neighbors.""
However, this value does not apply uniquely or particularly to handicapped
children. If anything, it seems handicapped children have more to gain than
other children from enmeshment within a close-knit, supportive community.
Justice Stevens's assertion would be more appropriate in the context of a law
journal debate about the constitutionality of any parochial schooling. 63
Meanwhile the Satmar Hasidim of Kiryas Joel-people closely knit in their
daily relations, kin networks, and shared practices, but otherwise liable to sharp
internal divisions-seek to preserve their group identity and simultaneously to
obtain government benefits in a manner that conforms to the religious
sociology of Protestantism, and to the religious establishment and equal
protection concerns of constitutional jurisprudence. A new judicial resolution
of the dispute should not come at the expense of Satmar children's ability to
receive special education in a setting consistent with the particular context of
their lives. While this Note does not suggest appropriate judicial strategies, it
urges judicial notice-and support-of the community's fledgling efforts to
draw circles keeping in "special" children. More broadly, rather than
continuing the search for a bright-line rule to cover fundamentally different
conflicts arising under the Establishment Clause, courts should be prepared to
adjudicate particular cases with much greater awareness of the shifting identity
of the very subject of rights. Here, the rights in question are those of
handicapped children in Kiryas Joel-to receive appropriate educational
services without being further marginalized in their home community.
163. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring). Minow notes that Justice Stevens's
concurrence in Kiryas Joel is "consistent with Justice Stevens' view expressed in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 50-55 (1985), that protection of individuals'-here, the schoolchildrens'-freedom of conscience
is the central focus of all the clauses of the First Amendment." Minow, supra note 6, at 15 n.76.
164. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring).
165. It is certainly possible to mount a forceful argument for the Protestant model of toleration and
freedom of religion as freedom of conscience but without separation of groups. Yet if "It]he children of
both Kiryas Joel and Monroe-Woodbury will be worse off if they grow up to fear or despise their fellow
citizens on the other side of the town line," Eisgruber, supra note 8, at 100-01, does this mean that any
form of parochial schooling is ultimately violative of children's rights and well-being? Against this it has
been suggested that if "secular humanism" as a public school ideology were held to "result[] in the
establishment of a 'religion' .... [i]t might even lead to the radical conclusion that public education is
unconstitutional per se." Stolzenberg, supra note 87, at 589. The plausibility of claiming that either public
education or parochial education is illegitimate under the general principle of "freedom of religion" shows
the near impossibility of reconciling the individual's "freedom to choose and change religion," Marc
Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 227, with
parental "freedom to transmit and implant religion in children," id. at 228.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Three major approaches are reflected in the Supreme Court opinions in
Kiryas Joel. One is Justice Scalia's rhetorical dismissal of the Establishment
Clause complaint.' 66 The second approach, significant primarily because it
reflects the heritage of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the post-World War II
decades, is Justice Stevens's almost nostalgic insistence on the handicapped
children's overriding right to interact with non-Hasidic children from the
surrounding area. The third approach is Justice Souter's and Justice
O'Connor's narrowly technical reading of unconstitutionality, which (at least
until August 1996) appeared to permit the school board to continue once the
New York Legislature rewrote the enabling legislation in terms less specific
to the Village of Kiryas Joel.
If there is indeed a Kiryas Joel II, the Court may face a harder choice.
Perhaps it will assert that, regardless of fine points of legislative procedure, the
First Amendment's commitment to free exercise of religion may in certain
situations entail a limitation of the power of the state to prevent local or
parochial "establishments of religion."'' 67 It might also admit that there are
inevitable limitations on the free exercise of religion, when such free exercise
is deemed incompatible with a predominant concern for preventing the
establishment of religion. Based on the notions of polity and identity that have
underlain constitutional jurisprudence until now, the Constitution may not be
able to resolve the Kiryas Joel paradox. Kiryas Joel might well be an object
lesson in the claim that "liberalism's deep structure precludes it from




That so much debate centers on the case indicates not only that it is a hard
one, but that it turns on central dilemmas of what we still call the American
polity.169 This Note has argued that Kiryas Joel presents a challenge to two
166. See supra note 116.
167. Lupu suggests that the inducement presented by -special benefits not readily a%ailable
elsewhere" to remain within "the Village and its religious ambience in itself tends tonsard establishment
of religion. Lupu, supra note 9, at 108. Yet the benefits are -special" only to those ssho salue being in the
Village and its religious ambience. In fact, students from outside the Village are bused in to the Kir)as Joel
special public school, and leaving the Village would not deprive any child of special education %%ithin a
secular public school setting.
168. Robert Justin Lipkin, Liberalism and the Possibiltt of Multi-Cultural Consititutionalism The
Distinction Berween Deliberative and Dedicated Cultures. 29 U. Ricii. L. REv 1263. 1265 (19951
169. This is despite the (frequently noted) irony that the Kir'as Joel school district litigation resulted
from an attempt-albeit perhaps not entirely a good faith attempt, at least on the part of the
Monroe-Voodbury School District, see supra text accompanying note 150---4o oercome the original
solution, which appeared unconstitutional after Aguilar and Bull. Justce O'Connor is most forthright in
asserting that the pre-Aguilar scheme was permissible, in regretting the Aguilar decision from shich she
had dissented, and in inviting the court "'in a proper case. [to] be prepared to reconsider Agalar - Board
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481. 2498 (1994j (O'Connor. J.
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Indeed. a challenge to Aguilar by the resident- of
Kiryas Joel might have resolved the situation in favor of the status quo before Agutlar and Ball. a situation
that is arguably preferable to the separate school district arrangement. See Eisgruber. supra note 8. at 95
("It would be better if the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel were enrolled in religious schools (een
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underlying assumptions of constitutional jurisprudence: first, that political
participation is determined according to territorial boundaries which are
politically neutral in themselves; and second, that the subject of rights can
always be specified as the individual person. This Note does not speculate on
whether or not constitutional jurisprudence will indeed prove flexible enough
to accommodate a broader range of notions of identity than the schema of
territoriality and individualism. 70 It does claim that such jurisprudence can
and must be enriched by revelation of the particularity of the premises about
personhood and belonging which have guided constitutional interpretation until
now. Kiryas Joel fosters such revelation by pressing the claims of an identity
dependent on genealogical and diasporic loyalty rather than individual and
territorial liberty.
Kiryas Joel is another in a series of cases that, as Cover teaches, press the
lawmaking claims of particular nomoi, sometimes in conflict with the nomos
of the territorial state. It teaches us as well that lawmaking is inseparable from
the conditions of cultural and generational continuity, and that a nomos
grounded even in the most passionate tradition of individual freedoms may be
cast into confusion when the freedoms in question are those of children.
Nevertheless, the continuing litigation of Kiryas Joel might yet foster the kind
of creative constitutionalism that Cover called jurisgenesis.
segregated religious schools), as New York's first accommodation allowed them to be."). As it turns out,
the school board may not have to face this choice. On October 30, 1996, petitioners New York City and
parents of parochial school students, with support from the Clinton Administration, in an unprecedented
motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asked the Supreme Court to overrule
Aguilar. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Asked to Reverse Ruling in a Religion Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
31, 1996, at Al. On January 17, 1997, the Court announced that it would consider the appeal. See Linda
Greenhouse, Court to Consider Reversing Decision on Parochial Aid, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1997, at A 12.
170. Nor is there any necessary implication here that opinions should rest on judges' perceptions of
the self-understandings of communities that appear before them in Establishment Clause cases. The vexing
question of who "represents" a community is not at issue here. Certainly I do not mean that judges should
cede to those purported communal self-understandings, on the analogy of federal appeals courts' judgment
consistent with the law of the state from which the appeal arises. The Supreme Court neither should nor
could sit in place of a rabbinical court.
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